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brains	were	located	inside	ancient	heads,	on	the	grounds	that,	to	the	extent	that	it	makes	
sense	to	talk	about	minds	being	located	at	all,	minds	are	always	located	where	brains	are.	
Fuelled	most	recently	by	the	excitement	surrounding	contemporary	brain-imaging	
techniques,	there	is	no	doubt	that,	right	now,	this	neuro-centric	conception	of	mind	is	the	
default	view	in	cognitive	psychology,	developmental	psychology,	cognitive-science-friendly	
philosophy,	and	indeed	in	many	other	intellectual	disciplines	that	concern	themselves	in	
one	way	or	another	with	psychological	phenomena.	Importantly,	in	the	present	context,	the	
reach	of	such	neuro-centrism	extends	not	only	to	neuroarchaeology,	but	also	to	cognitive	
archaeology	in	general,	understood	as	the	broader	endeavour	to	study	the	minds	of	our	
human	ancestors,	based	upon	the	surviving	material	archaeological	remains	and	by	drawing	
on	the	theories	and	concepts	deployed	by	contemporary	cognitive	science.	(For	just	one	
pioneering	example	of	the	broader	endeavour,	see	Mithen	1996.)	
	
Notwithstanding	the	overall	dominance	of	neuro-centrism,	however,	the	fact	remains	that,	
even	within	cognitive	science	itself,	there	is	an	increasingly	prominent	alternative.	
According	to	the	distributed	view	(often	traced	first	to	Hutchins	1995),	cognition	
(understood	liberally	as	encompassing	mind,	thought,	intelligence,	reasoning,	emotions,	
feelings	and	experience	–	in	short,	the	psychological)	is,	at	least	sometimes,	in	some	way,	
spread	out	over	the	brain,	the	non-neural	body	and,	in	many	paradigm	cases,	an	
environment	consisting	of	objects,	tools,	other	artefacts,	texts,	individuals	and/or	
social/institutional	structures.	The	phrase	‘in	some	way’	introduces	a	deliberate	vagueness	
into	the	specification	of	the	distributed	view.	As	we	shall	see	later,	how	one	fills	in	the	
details	of	the	‘spreading’	at	issue	will	determine	whether	the	distributed	view	is,	at	a	
fundamental	(one	might	even	say	‘metaphysical’)	level,	an	illuminating	modulation	of	the	
neuro-centric	view	or	an	altogether	more	surprising	position.	For	now,	however,	what’s	
important	is	this:	in	both	of	the	forms	in	which	we	shall	consider	it	below,	the	distributed	
perspective	highlights	the	important	roles	that	external	elements	routinely	play	in	
experience,	thought,	reason	and	so	on,	but	it	does	so	without	seeking	to	marginalize	the	
manifest	importance	of	the	brain	in	the	generation	of	these	phenomena.	Rather,	it	aims	to	
place	proper	emphasis	on	the	point	that,	to	understand	what	the	brain	actually	does,	one	
needs	to	take	account	of	the	subtle,	complex	and	often	surprising	ways	in	which	that	organ	
is	enmeshed	with	non-neural	bodily	and	environmental	factors.		
	
To	give	the	flavour	of	distributed	cognition,	here’s	a	brief	description	of	what	is	now	a	
canonical	example.	Early	modern	theatre	companies	performed	an	astonishing	number	of	
plays	(as	many	as	six	different	plays	a	week),	with	relatively	infrequent	repetition,	very	little	
group	rehearsal,	each	actor	playing	multiple	roles,	and	in	the	face	of	mounting	a	new	play	
roughly	every	fortnight.	If	we	imagine	a	scenario	in	which	each	actor	was	required	to	store	
each	of	these	plays	in	his	brain,	it	seems	that	we	would	be	forced	to	conclude	that	early	
modern	actors	possessed	super-human	organic	memory	capacities.	This	seems	unlikely,	so	
how	did	they	do	it?	Adopting	a	distributed	perspective,	Tribble	(2005,	2011)	argues	that	a	
number	of	tricks	and	ploys	resulted	in	the	seemingly	prohibitive	information	processing	
required	being	spread	out	over	the	individual	actor	and	the	physical	and	social	
environments	of	the	early	modern	theatre,	thus	rendering	it	manageable.	For	example,	
stripped-down	manuscript	parts	that	excised	all	unnecessary	information	(including	the	
other	parts,	save	for	sparse	line	cues)	were	used	in	conjunction	with	what	were	called	‘plots’	
–	sheets	of	paper	containing	scene-by-scene	accounts	of	entrances	and	exits,	casting,	and	
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sound	and	music	cues.	This	external	scaffolding	worked	by	assuming	both	the	particular	
three-dimensional	organization	of	the	physical	theatrical	space	(e.g.	the	door	arrangements	
on	the	early	modern	stage),	and	certain	conventions	of	movement	that	were	operative	in	
theatre	at	the	time	(meaning	that	the	door	through	which	an	actor	is	to	enter	or	exit	is	
hardly	ever	specified	in	the	aforementioned	plots).	Finally,	various	guild-like	social	
structures	and	protocols	supported	the	development	of	apprentice	actors,	enabling	them	to	
perform	progressively	more	complex	roles.		
	
How	does	the	distributed	cognition	paradigm	bear	on	our	present,	archaeological	concerns?	
Given	that	the	environmental	factors	highlighted	by	the	distributed	perspective	include	
items	of	material	culture,	it	is	tempting	to	see	a	symbiotic	connection	between	that	
cognitive-scientific	approach	and	archaeology,	especially	in	contexts	where	archaeologists	
seek	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	human	mind	from	material-cultural	evidence.	The	
background	picture	at	work	in	the	distributed	perspective	is	of	‘our	distinctive	universal	
human	nature,	insofar	as	it	exists	at	all,	[as]	a	nature	of	biologically	determined	openness	to	
deep,	learning-	and	development-mediated,	change’	(Wheeler	and	Clark	2008,	3572)	and	
thus,	given	a	technologically	saturated	environment,	of	human	organisms	as	what	Clark	
(2003)	calls	natural	born	cyborgs,	creatures	who	are	naturally	evolved,	both	now	and	in	the	
ancient	past,	to	seek	out	intimate	couplings	with	the	non-biological	resources	of	material	
culture.	Crucially,	as	should	be	clear	already,	such	couplings	extend	to	the	achievement	of	
psychological	feats	such	as,	for	example,	memory	and	reasoning.	Moreover,	in	a	process	
that	Clark	has	dubbed	cognitive	niche	construction	(e.g.	Clark	2008;	see	also	Wheeler	and	
Clark	2008),	which	is	nicely	illustrated	by	the	foregoing	example	of	distributed	memory	in	
the	early	modern	theatre,	human	beings	design	and	build	external	structures	that,	often	in	
combination	with	culturally	transmitted	practices,	transform	problem	spaces	in	ways	that	
typically	promote,	but	sometimes	(when	things	go	wrong)	obstruct,	thinking	and	reasoning.		
	
It	is	tempting	to	propose	that	when	the	problem	of	ancient	minds	is	approached	from	the	
distributed	perspective,	that	problem	will	lose	much	of	its	bite.	After	all,	the	idea	that	
human	cognition	is	shaped	fundamentally	by	organic-technological	hybridization	might	
reasonably	indicate	that	we	ought	to	be	able	to	say	quite	a	lot	about	ancient	minds	from	the	
archaeological	evidence	provided	by	the	technology	and	material	culture	with	which	those	
minds	were,	by	hypothesis,	intimately	coupled.	Indeed,	within	recent	archaeological	
theorizing,	it	might	seem	to	be	the	explicitly	distributed	dimension	of	Malafouris’s	
increasingly	influential	material	engagement	theory	that	enables	him	to	use	material	culture	
as	a	productive	bridge	between	experiential,	conceptual,	and	social	aspects	of	the	self	
(Malafouris	2013).	And	one	can	feel	the	same	putatively	beneficial	mutuality	bubbling	away	
just	beneath	the	surface	in	the	argument	by	Hodder	in	Chapter	1	regarding,	specifically,	
cognition	in	the	Neolithic	period	that,	given	the	notion	of	a	contextually	distributed	and	
plastic	mind,	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	the	Neolithic,	with	its	panoply	of	new	
techniques	and	ways	of	life,	would	be	associated	with	cognitive	change.		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	shall	interrogate	the	apparent	symbiosis	between	the	archaeology	of	
cognition	and	the	distributed	perspective.	I	shall	argue	that,	once	one	accepts	that	cognition	
is	distributed,	settling	the	nature	of	ancient	thought,	and,	more	particularly,	determining	
whether	cognitive	change	has	occurred,	on	the	basis	of	material-cultural	evidence,	is	a	
rather	more	complicated	business	than	one	might	have	imagined.	My	case	study	will	be	the	
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alleged	emergence	of	higher	levels	of	cognition	and	consciousness	in	the	Neolithic,	as	
indicated	by	the	material-cultural	evidence	at	Çatalhöyük.		
	
Before	we	start	our	investigation	proper,	two	clarifications	are	in	order.	Firstly,	In	the	spirit	
of	cross-disciplinary	fertilization,	this	chapter	approaches	the	question	of	changes	in	
consciousness	and	cognition	at	Çatalhöyük	from	the	perspective	of	the	philosophy	of	
cognitive	science.	As	a	consequence,	the	focus	of	discussion	will	be	on	the	underlying	
assumptions	and	the	general	structure	of	certain	considerations	and	inferences,	rather	than	
on	the	detailed	interpretation	of	specific	pieces	of	material	evidence.	That	said,	and	as	will	
become	clear,	the	arguments	of	this	chapter,	if	correct,	will	have	repercussions	for	how	we	
interpret	the	material	evidence,	and,	in	particular,	for	the	conclusions	that	we	might	draw,	
from	the	archaeological	data	at	Çatalhöyük,	regarding	changes	in	the	Neolithic	mind.	Put	
another	way,	the	goal	of	this	investigation	is	not	merely	to	draw	some	theoretical	
conclusions	about	the	relationship	between	distributed	cognition	and	archaeology,	but	to	
extract	some	lessons	about	what	we	are	entitled	to	say	about	changes	in	consciousness	and	
cognition	at	Çatalhöyük,	on	the	basis	of	the	available	material-cultural	evidence,	once	we	
allow	our	hypotheses	about	ancient	minds	to	be	shaped	by	certain	general	accounts	of	the	
basic	character	of	psychological	phenomena	that	are	operative	in	cognitive	science.			
	
Secondly,	although	the	intention	here	is	to	argue	that	which	theory	of	mind	an	
archaeologist	selects,	from	the	available	options	in	cognitive	science,	will	have	implications	
for	what	precisely	can	and	cannot	be	said	about	ancient	consciousness	and	cognition	on	the	
basis	of	the	material	record,	that	argument,	even	if	successful,	in	no	way	blocks	off	the	
other	direction	of	potential	cross-disciplinary	travel,	that	is,	a	situation	in	which	what	we	
learn	from	the	material	record	leads	us	to	say	something	different	about	our	scientific	
theories	of	mind.	We	might	discover,	for	example,	that	certain	elements	that	we	would	
expect	to	observe	in	ancient	material	culture,	if	a	particular	scientific	theory	of	mind	applies	
to	that	context,	simply	can’t	be	found,	thereby	casting	doubt	on	the	applicability	of	that	
theory,	at	least	as	it	stands.	But	that	direction	of	travel	is	not	what	is	at	issue	here.	With	
those	two	clarifications	in	place,	it	is	time	for	the	real	work	of	this	chapter	to	begin.		
	
2.	Material	Symbols	and	Cognitive	Change	
	
It	is,	of	course,	an	immensely	plausible	thought	that	historical	changes	in	habitation,	
agriculture,	technology	or	trade	indicate	the	introduction	of	new	techniques	and	ways	of	life	
that	will	be	associated	with	cognitive	change.	But	that’s	a	pretty	‘big-picture’	thought	and	
things	are	not	so	obvious	when	we	turn	our	attention	to	more	detailed	hypotheses	about	
which	particular	changes	or	innovations	in	which	particular	practices	drove,	were	driven	by,	
or	were	at	least	correlated	with,	which	particular	cognitive	changes.	Here	we	will	be	taking	
our	cues	from	one	such	detailed	hypothesis.		
	
Small	geometric	clay	objects	(spheres,	discs,	cones)	are	common	finds	in	all	occupational	
levels	at	Çatalhöyük.	So	what,	precisely,	are	these	objects?	One	prominent	proposal	is	that	
they	are	‘tokens’,	or	what	(drawing	on	terminology	from	the	distributed	cognition	literature)	
I	shall	call	‘material	symbols’.	In	other	words,	by	functioning	within	a	structured	system	of	
representational	relationships,	such	physical	objects	become	material	resources	for	
symbolic	information	storage.	Bennison-Chapman,	who,	as	we	shall	see,	proceeds	to	
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question	this	interpretation	of	the	objects	concerned,	characterizes	‘tokens’	(material	
symbols)	as:	‘small	tools	acting	as	mnemonic	aids,	used	to	hold	and	transmit	information.	
They	are	utilised	within	the	sphere	of	administration,	to	store	and	communicate	
information.’	(Bennison-Chapman,	this	volume,	Chapter	5).	So,	if	the	small	geometric	clay	
objects	recovered	at	Çatalhöyük	are	indeed	material	symbols,	they	should	be	interpretable	
as	the	physical	realizers	of	recombinable	symbols	within	a	standardized	system	in	which	
simple	geometric	shapes	in	different	sizes	are	used	to	represent	units	of,	for	example,	
animals,	crops,	processed	foods	and	raw	materials.		
	
So	far,	so	good,	but	how	does	the	claim	that	there	are	material	symbols	at	Çatalhöyük	bear	
on	the	question	of	cognitive	change?	According	to	thinkers	such	as	Schmandt-Besserat	
(1992),	Renfrew	(1998,	2012)	and	Watkins	(2010),	the	appearance	of	material	symbols	in	
the	archaeological	record	is	evidence	of	a	shift	in	cognitive	capacities,	since	only	a	more	
‘advanced’	mind	has	the	‘higher’	cognitive	abilities	that	are	required	to	invent	and	operate	a	
symbolic	system,	where	the	candidates	for	such	‘higher’	abilities	include	objectification,	
abstraction	(taking	a	particular	shape	to	represent,	say,	an	animal)	and	metrication.	With	
Neolithic	village	life	in	general	(not	just	at	Çatalhöyük)	identified	by	the	aforementioned	
thinkers	as	a	source	for	such	evidence,	the	precise	historical	drivers	for	the	transition	in	
question	are	a	matter	of	debate,	with	some	(e.g.	Schmandt-Besserat,	Renfrew)	tending	to	
favour	something	like	a	shift	from	a	mobile	hunter-gatherer	lifestyle	to	one	of	sedentary	
agriculture,	and	thus	from	a	form	of	community	in	which	the	counting	of	resources	was	not	
necessary	to	one	in	which	it	was,	and	others	(e.g.	Watkins)	favouring	factors	such	as	the	
possibilities	for	expressing	and	storing	more	complex	concepts	opened	up	by	the	new	built	
environment	and	the	cognitive	challenges	posed	by	the	social	fact	that	the	members	of	the	
community	were	now	living	alongside	one	another	on	a	more	permanent	basis.	This	debate	
over	the	historical	drivers	of	cognitive	change	(and	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	views	I	
have	just	canvassed	do	not	exhaust	the	available	options),	provides	part	of	the	backdrop	to	
the	archaeological	research	project	explored	in	this	volume,	in	which	Çatalhöyük,	with	its	
large	amount	of	data,	is	used	as	a	laboratory	for	testing	hypotheses	about	the	causes	of	
cognitive	change	(Hodder,	this	volume,	Chapter	1).	More	specifically,	one	line	of	
investigation	is	to	agree	that	material	symbols	exist	at	the	site	and	then	to	interrogate	the	
archaeological	data	with	the	aim	of	revealing	the	cause	of	their	emergence	and	thus	of	the	
associated	cognitive	change	(Chapter	1).	But	it	is	the	shared,	motivating	idea	that	sits	
behind	the	search	for	the	specific	historical	drivers	that	concerns	us	here.	That	idea	is	that	
the	deployment	of	material	symbols	requires	certain	sophisticated	forms	of	cognition	and	
consciousness,	so	the	appearance	of	such	symbols	in	material	culture	marks	the	emergence	
of	new	psychological	capacities.				
	
To	help	us	explore	this	theoretical	territory,	and	concentrating	specifically	on	Çatalhöyük,	
we	can	express	the	central	line	of	reasoning	just	traversed	in	the	form	of	an	explicit	
argument.		
	
Premise	1:	The	appearance	of	material	symbols	in	the	archaeological	record	at	a	
site	constitutes	evidence	of	cognitive	change,	in	that	period,	at	that	site.	More	
specifically,	it	constitutes	evidence	of	a	shift	to	certain	sophisticated	forms	of	
cognition	and	consciousness.	
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Premise	2:	The	small	geometric	clay	objects	found	at	the	Neolithic	site	of	
Çatalhöyük	are	material	symbols.		
	
Conclusion:	There	is	evidence	of	cognitive	change	at	the	Neolithic	site	of	
Çatalhöyük,	and,	more	specifically,	of	a	shift	to	certain	sophisticated	forms	of	
cognition	and	consciousness.	
	
Now,	if	someone	wanted	to	reject	this	argument,	and	thus	the	claim	that	there	was	a	shift	
to	sophisticated	levels	of	cognition	and	consciousness	at	Çatalhöyük	evidenced	by	the	
discovery	of	material	symbols	at	the	site	(there	might,	of	course,	be	an	alternative	basis	for	
the	conclusion	that	such	a	shift	has	taken	place),	one	strategy	would	be	to	reject	the	second	
premise,	that	is,	to	argue	that	the	small	geometric	clay	objects	found	at	Çatalhöyük	are	not	
material	symbols.	This	is	precisely	what	Bennison-Chapman	(this	volume)	does.	First	she	
identifies	a	suite	of	conditions	that	would	plausibly	need	to	be	met,	if	the	clay	objects	in	
question	really	did	function	as	material	symbols	in	the	manner	required.	Among	these	
conditions	are	things	like	being	crafted	into	a	range	of	standardized	shapes	and	sizes	
consistent	with	the	range	of	goods	present	in	the	Çatalhöyük	economy,	being	used	in	
groups,	and	being	retained	for	later	information	retrieval.	Then	she	presents	detailed	
archaeological	evidence	from	the	site	which	strongly	suggests	that	the	conditions	in	
question	are	not	met.	For	example,	there	is	no	evidence	of	development	in	the	range	or	
homogeneity	of	form	of	the	clay	objects.	In	addition,	the	objects	in	question	are	usually	
recovered	alone	and	often	within	disposal	contexts.		Finally,	she	presents	considerations	in	
favour	of	certain	alternative	hypotheses	regarding	the	function	of	the	objects,	such	as	that	
they	were	gaming	pieces	or	that	they	were	simple	counting	(as	opposed	to	accounting	or	
recording)	tools,	used	in	a	one-to-one	correspondence	with	individual	items	in	particular	
counting	events	(and	thus	not	as	part	of	a	symbolic	system).	
	
As	fascinating	and	as	important	as	this	dispute	is,	it	does	not	matter,	for	our	purposes	here,	
whether	Bennison-Chapman	is	right	that	the	small	geometric	clay	objects	found	at	
Çatalhöyük	are	not	material	symbols.	What’s	more	significant	is	that	that	conclusion,	which	
constitutes	the	denial	of	premise	2	in	our	highlighted	argument,	leaves	premise	1	of	that	
argument	intact.	Put	another	way,	Bennison-Chapman	is,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	happy	to	
believe,	along	with	her	opponents,	that	the	appearance	of	material	symbols	in	the	
archaeological	record	at	a	site	constitutes	evidence	of	cognitive	change	–	and	more	
specifically	of	a	shift	to	certain	sophisticated	forms	of	cognition	and	consciousness	–	in	that	
period,	at	that	site.	Thus,	for	Bennison-Chapman	and	her	opponents,	if	the	geometric	clay	
objects	found	at	Çatalhöyük	are	material	symbols,	that	would	be	good	evidence	of	the	
emergence	of	certain	advanced	cognitive	capacities	there;	it’s	just	that,	for	Bennison-
Chapman,	those	objects	aren’t	material	symbols,	whereas,	for	her	opponents,	they	are.	But	
now	what	about	the	shared	premise	itself?	Is	that	correct?	If	it	isn’t,	then	the	link	between	
material	symbols	and	sophisticated	levels	of	consciousness	and	cognition	is	broken,	and	the	
recovery	of	material	symbols	at	some	site	would	not	be	evidence	of	cognitive	change.	Under	
these	circumstances,	even	if	Bennison-Chapman	is	wrong,	and	the	small	geometric	clay	
objects	recovered	at	Çatalhöyük	are	indeed	material	symbols,	that	would	not	be	evidence	of	
the	proposed	emergence	of	sophisticated	levels	of	consciousness	and	cognition	in	the	
Neolithic	mind.			
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The	remainder	of	this	chapter	will	focus	on	premise	1	of	the	target	argument,	on,	that	is,	the	
claim	that	the	appearance	of	material	symbols	in	the	archaeological	record	at	a	site	
constitutes	evidence	of	cognitive	change,	in	that	period,	at	that	site,	and	more	specifically	of	
a	shift	to	certain	sophisticated	forms	of	cognition	and	consciousness.	Facing	up	to	the	
problem	of	ancient	minds,	what	we	really	want	to	know	is	what	went	on	in	the	minds	of	our	
ancient	ancestors	when	they	interacted	with	external	symbols	systems,	and	whether	the	
introduction	of	such	systems	heralded	a	radical	shift	in	the	fundamental	nature	of	their	
cognitive	resources.	In	an	attempt	to	meet	these	challenges,	we	can	pursue	a	strategy	that	
is,	in	truth,	a	close	neighbour	of	the	neuroarchaeologist’s	appeal	to	what	we	know	about	
the	psychological	states	and	processes	that	are	present	when	contemporary	human	beings	
perform	certain	kinds	of	task	(see	above).	That	is,	we	can	find	out	what	contemporary	
cognitive	science	tells	us	about	what	goes	on	in	people’s	minds	when	they	interact	with	
modern	external	symbol	systems.		More	specifically,	given	that	the	distributed	perspective	
looks	like	it’s	the	archaeologist’s	friend,	we	can	find	out	what	that	particular	perspective	in	
contemporary	cognitive	science	tells	us	about	the	psychological	states	and	processes	in	
play.	Then	we	can	extrapolate	to	the	case	of	ancient	material	symbols	and	ancient	minds.	
So,	it	is	by	seeing	if/how	the	distributed	perspective	provides	a	theoretical	bridge	from	
ancient	material	symbols	to	ancient	cognition	–	a	connection	which	is	at	the	centre	of	the	
highlighted	research	on	Çatalhöyük	–	that	the	alleged	symbiosis	between	the	archaeological	
investigation	of	the	ancient	mind	and	distributed	cognition	may	be	assessed.	
	
3.	Distributed	Cognition	1:	Embedded	Minds	
	
In	a	series	of	compelling	cognitive-scientific	treatments	that	combine	philosophical	
reflection	with	empirical	modelling	studies,	Bechtel	(1994,	1996;	see	also	Bechtel	and	
Abrahamsen	1991)	develops	and	defends	the	view	that	certain	‘advanced’	cognitive	
achievements,	such	as	mathematical	reasoning,	natural	language	processing	and	natural	
deduction,	are	the	result	of	sensorimotor-mediated	embodied	interactions	between	in-the-
head	connectionist	networks	and	external	symbol	systems.	In	cognitive	science,	the	term	
'connectionist	network'	picks	out	a	class	of	systems	in	which	a	(typically)	large	number	of	
interconnected	units	process	information	in	parallel.	In	as	much	as	the	brain	too	is	made	up	
of	a	large	number	of	interconnected	units	(neurons)	that	process	information	in	parallel,	
connectionist	networks	are	`neurally	inspired',	although	usually	at	a	massive	level	of	
abstraction.	At	the	heart	of	connectionist	theorizing	is	the	concept	of	a	distributed	
representation	–	a	pattern	of	activation	spread	out	across	a	group	of	processing	units	
(analogous	to	a	pattern	of	neural	activity	in	a	brain).	One	feature	of	connectionist	networks	
that	has	made	them	popular	with	many	cognitive	theorists	is	that,	as	a	by-product	of	their	
basic	processing	architecture	and	form	of	information	storage,	properties	which	endow	
them	with	a	powerful	line	in	statistical	pattern	completion,	these	systems	‘naturally’	
demonstrate	a	range	of	intelligence-related	capabilities	that	plausibly	underlie	the	
distinctive	psychological	profile	of	biological	thinkers.	Such	capacities	include	flexible	
generalization	from	existing	data,	default	reasoning,	and	the	graceful	degradation	of	
performance	in	the	face	of	restricted	damage	or	noisy/inaccurate	input	information.	What’s	
striking	about	Bechtel’s	explanation	of	our	sophisticated	cognitive	achievements	in	(roughly)	
mathematics,	language	and	formal	logic	is	that	the	genuinely	psychological	contribution	at	
work	is	exhausted	by	these	sorts	of	biologically	realistic	capabilities.	The	rest	is	a	matter	of	
embodied	interaction	with,	and	environmental	scaffolding	by,	external	material	symbols.	
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But	why,	exactly,	is	this	striking?	To	answer	that	question,	and	to	understand	more	
precisely,	from	a	distributed	perspective,	what’s	going	on	in	Bechtel’s	explanation,	we	need	
to	make	contact	with	one	of	the	most	famous	quarrels	in	cognitive-scientific	history.					
	
In	contrast	to	connectionism,	the	classical	form	of	cognitive	science	denies	that	the	abstract	
structure	of	the	brain	is	a	good	model	for	the	nature	of	mind.	Rather,	it	demands,	we	should	
pay	attention	to	the	abstract	structure	of	human	language.	Such	language	(on	one	popular	
account	anyway)	is	at	root	a	finite	storehouse	of	atomic	symbols	(words)	which	are	
combined	into	complex	expressions	(phrases,	sentences,	and	so	on)	according	to	certain	
formal-syntactic	rules	(grammar).	The	meaning	of	some	complex	expression	is	a	function	of	
the	meaning	of	each	atomic	symbol	that	figures	as	a	constituent	in	that	expression,	plus	the	
syntactic	structure	of	the	expression	(as	determined	by	the	rules	of	the	grammar).	In	short,	
human	language	features	a	combinatorial	(equivalently,	compositional)	syntax	and	
semantics.	And,	for	the	classical	cognitive	scientist,	so	it	goes	for	our	inner	psychology.	That	
too	is	based	on	a	finite	storehouse	of	atomic	symbols	(concepts)	that	are	combined	into	
complex	expressions	(thoughts)	according	to	a	set	of	syntactic	rules.	In	short,	thinking,	like	
language,	features	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics.	Thus	Fodor	famously	speaks	of	
our	inner	psychological	system	as	a	language	of	thought	(Fodor	1975).		
	
One	much-discussed	argument	for	the	classical	view	(and	thus	against	connectionism)	hails	
from	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	(1988)	who	claim	that	connectionist	theorizing	about	the	mind	is,	
at	best,	no	more	than	a	good	explanation	of	how	classical	states	and	processes	may	be	
implemented	in	neural	systems.	In	brief,	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	argue	as	follows.	It’s	an	
empirical	observation	that	thought	is	systematic.	In	other	words,	the	ability	to	have	some	
thoughts	(e.g.	that	Elsie	loves	Murray)	is	intrinsically	connected	to	the	ability	to	have	certain	
other	thoughts	(e.g.	that	Murray	loves	Elsie).	If	we	adopt	a	classical	vision	of	mind,	the	
systematicity	of	thought	is	straightforwardly	explained	by	the	combinatorial	syntax	and	
semantics	of	the	cognitive	representational	system.	The	intrinsic	connectedness	of	the	
different	thoughts	in	question	results	from	the	fact	that	the	processing	architecture	
contains	a	set	of	atomic	symbols	alongside	certain	syntactic	rules	for	recombining	those	
symbols	into	different	molecular	expressions.	Now,	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	argue	that	although	
there	is	a	sense	in	which	connectionist	networks	instantiate	structured	states	(e.g.	
distributed	connectionist	representations	have	active	units	as	parts),	specifically	
combinatorial	structure	is	not	an	essential	or	a	fundamental	property	of	those	states.	This	
ultimately	renders	connectionist	networks	inherently	incapable	of	explaining	the	
systematicity	of	thought,	and	thus	of	explaining	thinking.	What	such	systems	might	do,	
however,	is	explain	how	a	classical	computational	architecture	may	be	implemented	in	an	
organic	brain.		
	
Bechtel	explicitly	develops	his	account	in	opposition	to	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn’s	deflationary	
conclusions	regarding	connectionism.	That	said,	he	agrees	with	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	on	two	
key	points,	firstly	that	where	systematicity	is	present,	it	is	to	be	explained	by	combinatorially	
structured	representations,	and	secondly	that	connectionist	networks	fail	to	instantiate	
combinatorial	structure	as	an	essential	property	of	their	internal	organization.	He	does	not	
need	to	endorse	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn’s	claim	that	all	thought	is	systematic,	however.	For	his	
purposes,	all	that	is	required	is	that	some	cognitive	activities	(e.g.	linguistic	behaviour,	
natural	deduction,	mathematical	reasoning)	exhibit	systematicity.	Bechtel’s	distinctive	(anti-
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Fodor-and-Pylyshyn)	move	is	to	locate	the	necessary	combinatorial	structure	in	systems	of	
symbolic	representations	that	remain	external	to	the	connectionist	network	itself	(e.g.	in	
written	or	spoken	language,	or	in	mathematical/logical	notations).	Given	the	idea	that	our	
inner	psychology	should	be	conceived	in	connectionist	terms,	this	is	tantamount	to	saying	
that	the	necessary	combinatorial	structure	resides	not	in	our	internal	processing	engine,	but	
rather	in	the	environment.	For	this	solution	to	work,	it	must	be	possible	for	the	natural	
sensitivity	to	statistical	patterns	that	we	find	in	connectionist	networks	generally	to	be	
deployed	in	such	a	way	that	some	of	those	networks,	when	in	interaction	with	specific	
external	symbol	systems,	may	come	to	respect	the	constraints	of	a	combinatorial	syntax,	
even	though	their	own	inner	representations	are	not	so	structured.	Bechtel’s	studies	
suggest	that	this	may	be	achieved	by	exploiting	factors	such	as	the	capacity	of	connectionist	
networks	to	recognize	and	generalize	from	patterns	in	bodies	of	training	data	(e.g.	large	
numbers	of	correct	derivations	in	sentential	arguments),	plus	the	temporal	constraints	that	
characterize	real	embodied	engagements	with	stretches	of	external	symbol	structures	(e.g.	
different	parts	of	the	input	will	be	available	to	the	network	at	different	times,	due	to	the	
restrictions	imposed	by	temporal	processing	windows).	The	conclusion	is	that	‘by	dividing	
the	labor	between	external	symbols	which	must	conform	to	syntactical	principles	and	a	
cognitive	system	which	is	sensitive	to	those	constraints	without	itself	employing	
syntactically	structured	representations,	one	can	perhaps	explain	the	systematicity…	of	
cognitive	performance’	(Bechtel	1994,	438).	
	
As	defined	earlier,	cognition	is	distributed	when	it	is,	in	some	way,	spread	out	over	the	
brain,	the	non-neural	body	and	(in	many	paradigm	cases)	an	environment	consisting	of	
objects,	tools,	other	artefacts,	texts,	individuals	and/or	social/institutional	structures.	
Bechtel’s	model	of	an	inner	connectionist	network	in	embodied	interaction	with	material	
symbols,	where	the	external	symbol	system	explains	the	systematicity	of	cognitive	
performance,	fits	the	bill.	Moreover,	it’s	an	example	of	the	distributed	perspective	at	work	
that	speaks	directly	to	the	issue	of	what	goes	on	in	people’s	minds	when	they	interact	with	
external	symbol	systems.	But	now	we	need	to	be	more	specific	about	the	precise	form	of	
distributed	cognition	that’s	on	the	table,	because	it	turns	out	that,	despite	the	shared,	
paradigm-defining	emphasis	on	bodily	engagement	and	environment-involving	processing,	
the	term	‘distributed	cognition’	is	actually	an	umbrella	concept	that	encompasses	a	number	
of	distinct	theoretical	views.	Two	modulations	of	the	core	idea	will	be	relevant	here,	
modulations	which	are	generated	by	different	conceptions	of	what	is	involved	in	cognition	
spreading	out	over	brain,	body	and	world.		
	
According	to	the	hypothesis	of	embedded	cognition,	the	distinctive	adaptive	richness	and/or	
flexibility	of	intelligent	thought	and	action	is	regularly,	and	perhaps	sometimes	necessarily,	
causally	dependent	on	the	bodily	exploitation	of	certain	environmental	props	or	scaffolds.	
(For	philosophical	elucidations	and	explorations	of	this	idea,	see	e.g.	Clark	1997,	Wheeler	
2005),	What’s	important	about	this	approach,	for	present	purposes,	is	that	although	the	
embedded	theorist	seeks	to	register	the	routinely	performance-boosting,	often	
transformative,	and	sometimes	necessary	causal	contributions	made	by	environmental	
elements	to	many	cognitive	outcomes	(witness	the	role	of	Bechtel’s	external	symbols	in	
explaining	systematicity),	she	continues	to	hold	that	the	actual	thinking	going	on	in	such	
cases	remains	brain-bound.	(There	is	a	less	common,	more	radical	iteration	of	the	view	
according	to	which	cognition	is	distributed	through	the	brain	and	the	non-neural	body,	
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although	not	the	environment.	I	shall	ignore	this	option.)	It’s	the	embedded	version	of	
distributed	cognition	that	Bechtel	seems	to	prefer.	Thus	his	claim	that	the	‘property	of	
systematicity,	and	the	compositional	syntax	and	semantics	that	underlie	that	property,	
might	best	be	attributed	to	natural	languages	themselves	but	not	to	the	mental	
mechanisms	involved	in	language	use’	(Bechtel	1994,	436)	is	plausibly	explained	by	the	fact	
that	he	takes	the	only	genuinely	cognitive	elements	in	the	nexus	of	neural,	bodily	and	
environmental	factors	to	be	inside	the	head:	systematicity	and	combinatorial	structure	are	
features	of	the	external	symbol	systems,	but	not	the	mental	mechanisms	involved,	because	
the	only	mental	mechanisms	involved	are	the	inner	connectionist	networks	that	do	not	
themselves	exhibit	systematicity	or	combinatorial	structure.		
	
Re-entering	the	archaeological	context,	if	the	embedded	interpretation	of	Bechtel’s	model	is	
correct,	what	we	confront	is	an	infuriating	resuscitation	of	the	problem	of	ancient	minds.	To	
see	why,	notice	that,	on	that	interpretation,	the	cognitive	mechanisms	implicated	in	
navigating	and	exploiting	the	sorts	of	external	material	symbol	system	under	consideration	
(material	realizations	of	symbolic	logical	notation,	say)	do	not	involve	sophisticated	
cognitive	capacities,	over	and	above	those	that	were	already	operative	in	the	non-symbolic	
context.	So,	by	extrapolation,	the	same	natural	sensitivity	to	statistical	patterns	that	we	find	
in	connectionist	networks	generally,	a	sensitivity	which	underlies	capacities	for	
generalization,	default	reasoning	and	graceful	degradation	that	surely	will	have	been	central	
to	all	kinds	of	adaptive	thought	and	experience	in	prior	hunter-gatherer	communities,	may	
continue	to	characterize	cognition	in	the	new	Neolithic	environment	of	(we	are	currently	
assuming)	material	symbols,	simply	by	becoming	targeted	on	patterns	in	the	external	
symbolic	systems	in	question.	So,	if,	from	the	perspective	of	the	embedded	version	of	
distributed	cognition,	we	ask	ourselves	the	question	‘Does	the	presence	of	an	external	
material	symbol	system	require,	or	at	least	strongly	indicate,	cognitive	change,	in	the	sense	
of	the	installation	of	a	revolutionary	package	of	more	sophisticated	psychological	
capacities?’,	our	answer	should	be	‘no’.	This	is	because,	on	the	basis	of	Bechtel’s	model,	the	
increased	sophistication	of	the	observed	psychological	performance	may	have	been	
purchased	using	the	same	old	connectionist	currency	of	statistical	pattern	completion	that	
was	already	operative,	but	which	is	now	newly	allied	with	some	powerful	external	
scaffolding	(the	material	symbol	system)	that	allowed	the	Neolithic	mind,	including	that	
mind	as	realized	at	Çatalhöyük,	to	buy	more	for	its	psychological	money.		
	
These	thoughts	find	additional	support	in	some	reflections	by	Clark	(1997)	on	what	happens	
to	the	brain	with	the	advent	of	language.	Clark’s	proposal	–	which	we	can	interpret	for	the	
moment	as	an	example	of	embedded	theorizing	–	is	that	language	should	be	thought	of	as	
‘an	external	resource	that	complements	but	does	not	profoundly	alter	the	brain’s	own	basic	
modes	of	representation	and	computation’	(198).	In	other	words,	the	biological	brain	has	
certain	generic	forms	of	inner	state	and	mechanism	(‘the	brain’s	own	basic	modes	of	
representation	and	computation’)	that,	from	both	an	evolutionary	and	a	developmental	
perspective,	precede	linguistic	competence.	When	language	comes	onto	the	cognitive	
scene,	it	heralds	not	a	transformation	in	those	generic	types	of	inner	resource,	but	rather	an	
external	augmentation	of	them.	Indeed,	buying	into	a	broadly	connectionist	approach	to	
cognitive	science,	Clark	takes	the	human	brain	to	be	essentially	a	device	for	pattern-
association,	pattern-completion	and	pattern-manipulation.	So	Clark’s	recognizably	
Bechtelian	claim	is	that	our	language-involving	behaviour	is	to	be	explained	by	an	all-
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conquering	partnership	between,	on	the	one	hand,	a	pattern-sensitive	brain	and,	on	the	
other,	an	external	storehouse	of	rich	symbolic	structures.		
	
To	bring	Clark’s	position	into	proper	view,	it	is	worth	pausing	to	compare	it	with	a	related	
account	that,	tentatively,	Clark	himself	attributes	to	Dennett	(Dennett	1991;	Clark	1997,	
197).	Dennett	argues	that	our	innate	neural	hardware	may	differ	from	that	of	our	non-
linguistic	evolutionary	near-neighbours	(such	as	chimpanzees)	in	only	relatively	minor	ways.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	precisely	these	relatively	minor	hardware	differences	that	constitute	the	
evolutionary	source	of	the	human	ability	to	create,	learn	and	use	public	language.	According	
to	Clark,	this	part	of	Dennett’s	story	is	correct:	there	is	no	mandate	to	attribute	human	
beings	with	the	kind	of	innate	language	processing	mechanism	whose	design	would	mean	
that	our	brains,	compared	with	those	of	our	evolutionary	near-neighbours,	contain	a	
fundamentally	different	kind	of	neural	device.	However,	Dennett’s	further	proposal,	as	Clark	
explains	it,	is	that	developmental	exposure	to	a	linguistic	environment	results	in	a	subtle	
reprogramming	of	the	computational	resources	of	the	human	brain,	such	that	our	innate	
pattern-completing	neural	architecture	comes	to	simulate	a	kind	of	logic-like	serial	
processing	device.	Clark,	by	contrast,	resists	the	idea	of	any	extensive	ontogenetic	
reprogramming	phase	driven	by	language.	Thus,	we	are	told,	developmental	exposure	to	
and	use	of	language	brings	about	no	significant	reorganization	of	the	brain’s	basic	
processing	architecture.	If	this	is	true	for	our	linguistic	capabilities,	the	same	points	can	
surely	be	made	regarding	the	psychological	capacities	required	to	create,	learn	and	use	the	
material	symbol	systems	that	pre-date	writing.		
	
The	foregoing	considerations	cast	doubt	on	the	inference	from	the	appearance	of	material	
symbols	in	the	archaeological	record	to	the	occurrence	of	significant	cognitive	change.	They	
also	indicate	that	distributed	cognition	may	not	be	quite	the	friend	that	the	archaeologist	
interested	in	ancient	minds	needs.	After	all,	so	far	anyway,	our	foray	into	distributed	
cognition	suggests	that,	with	the	explanatory	weight	spread	over	brain,	body	and	world,	
plus,	crucially,	the	intimate	causal	couplings	between	these	different	but	complementary	
elements,	there	is	no	secure	inferential	bridge	from	what	we	recover	in	the	form	of	material	
culture	to	changes	in	the	nature	of	cognition.	Old	brains	don't	necessarily	need	to	learn	
substantially	new	cognitive	tricks,	in	order	to	deliver	more	sophisticated	psychological	
achievements	following	innovations	in	material	culture.			
	
4.	Distributed	Cognition	II:	Extended	Minds	
	
Perhaps	we	are	not	being	radical	enough	in	our	adoption	of	a	distributed	perspective.	In	
spite	of	all	its	exciting	talk	of	embodied	interaction	and	environmental	scaffolding,	the	fact	
remains	that	the	embedded	version	of	distributed	cognition	shares	a	central	traditional	
assumption	with	the	neuro-centric	orthodoxy,	namely	that	psychological	states	and	
processes	are	instantiated	in	physical	machinery	that	is	always	inside	the	skull	and	skin.	
Thus	certain	external	elements	act	as	non-cognitive	factors	that	support	and	augment	the	
wholly	internal	cognitive	states	and	processes.	Looking	at	this	aspect	of	the	embedded	view	
from	a	different	angle,	and	borrowing	a	way	of	putting	things	from	Adams	and	Aizawa	
(2008),	a	key	feature	of	embedded	cognition	is	that	the	dependence	of	cognition	on	
external	elements	is	causal	–	or,	to	bring	out	what	really	matters,	merely	causal	–	rather	
than	constitutive.	If	the	dependence	in	question	were	constitutive	in	character,	then	the	
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external	elements	of	interest	would	not	be	non-cognitive	causal	scaffolds	for	cognition;	they	
would	count	as	genuine	parts	of	the	cognitive	process	or	architecture.					
	
This	is	the	view	endorsed	by	the	second	version	of	the	distributed	perspective	to	be	
canvassed	here.	Thus,	according	to	the	hypothesis	of	extended	cognition,	the	physical	
machinery	of	mind	sometimes	extends	beyond	the	skull	and	skin	(see	Clark	and	Chalmers	
1998	and	Clark	2008	for	canonical	treatments,	and	for	a	more	recent	collection	that	
contains	criticisms,	defences	and	developments	of	the	view,	see	Menary	2010).	More	
precisely,	the	advocate	of	extended	cognition	holds	that	there	are	actual	(in	this	world)	
cases	of	intelligent	thought	and	action,	in	which	the	material	vehicles	that	realize	the	
thinking	and	thoughts	concerned	are	spatially	distributed	over	brain,	body	and	world,	in	
such	a	way	that	certain	external	elements	are	rightly	accorded	fundamentally	the	same	
cognitive	status	as	would	ordinarily	be	accorded	to	a	subset	of	your	neurons.	If	this	view	is	
right,	then,	under	certain	circumstances,	your	phone-number-storing	mobile	device	literally	
counts	as	part	of	your	mind,	in	the	sense	that	it’s	part	of	your	mnemonic	machinery.		
	
Here	is	not	the	place	to	develop	and	defend	a	detailed	account	of	when	some	external	
element,	such	as	a	material	symbol,	qualifies	as	a	constituent	part	of	one’s	psychological	
machinery,	that	is,	in	the	relevant	sense,	as	part	of	one’s	extended	mind.	As	we	might	
expect,	there	are	several	proposals	for	delivering	this	result	and	a	sometimes	bad-tempered	
debate	surrounds	them.	(Menary	2010	is	a	good	place	to	make	contact	with	the	debate.	For	
my	own	favoured	way	of	arguing	for	extended	cognition,	see	e.g.	Wheeler	2010a,	2010b,	
2011.)	However,	it’s	important	to	note	that	the	transition	to	approaching	things	in	terms	of	
extended,	rather	than	embedded,	cognition	does	not	necessarily	require	any	associated	
change	in	the	underlying	causal	structure	of	the	distributed	system	under	consideration.	
Rather,	it	may	be	based	on	an	acknowledgment	that	some	of	the	causal	structures	present	
in	that	system	meet	the	conditions	for	cognitive	status.	To	see	how	this	might	work,	
consider,	once	again,	the	Bechtelian	connectionist-network-plus-symbol-system	
architecture	described	above,	which	so	far,	and	in	line	with	Bechtel’s	own	approach,	has	
been	treated	as	an	instance	of	embedded	cognition.	For	the	sake	of	argument,	let’s	simply	
assume	that	we	have	been	convinced	by	various	considerations	that	where	one	finds	a	
suitably	organized	material	system	in	which	atomic	symbols	are	automatically	combined	
and	manipulated,	according	to	the	principles	of	a	compositional	syntax	and	semantics,	so	as	
to	meet	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn’s	systematicity	requirement,	one	finds	a	cognitive	system.	
(Something	like	this	view	is	endorsed	by	Newell	and	Simon’s	physical	symbol	system	
hypothesis,	one	of	the	canonical	statements	of	classical	cognitive	science;	Newell	and	Simon	
1976.)	Under	these	circumstances,	one	might	be	moved	to	claim	that	Bechtel’s	distributed	
architecture,	comprising	an	inner	connectionist	network	and	external	symbols	coupled	
together	via	embodied	sensorimotor	interactions,	itself	qualifies	as	just	such	an	automatic,	
material,	compositional	symbol	system,	and	thus	as	a	cognitive	system.	In	other	words,	in	
this	distributed	architecture,	the	genuinely	cognitive	machinery	includes	not	only	the	
connectionist	network,	but	also	the	embodied	interface	and	the	external	material	symbols	
themselves.	Conceived	this	way,	a	Bechtelian	architecture	for	doing	mathematics,	natural	
language	processing	or	natural	deduction	is	a	case	of	extended	cognition.		
	
If	the	extended	interpretation	of	Bechtel’s	model	is	correct,	things	certainly	look	a	little	
better	for	the	archaeologist	interested	in	ancient	minds.	After	all,	whether	we	are	working	
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from	within	neuro-centrism	or	from	within	an	embedded	distributed	perspective,	material	
culture	is	condemned	to	a	life	outside	of	cognition	proper,	and	so	the	objects	and	artefacts	
studied	by	archaeology	are	(roughly)	things	that	ancient	minds	made	and/or	used.	The	
cognitive	states	and	processes	concerned	are	not	themselves	simply	on	show	in	those	
things,	although	certain	inferences	about	the	nature	of	those	states	and	processes	might	be	
ventured.	(Enter	the	problem	of	ancient	minds.)	However,	with	the	cognitive	architecture	
concerned	now	conceptualized	as	including	the	external	material	symbols,	past	ways	of	
thought	are	not	just	expressed	in	material	culture	but	are	often	partly	constituted	by	
material	culture.	So	the	archaeologist	gets	to	study	past	minds	in	a	rather	more	direct	
manner.	Indeed,	some	of	the	things	studied	by	archaeology	are	literally	parts	of	(no	longer	
functioning)	ancient	minds	(Wheeler	2010b).	So,	if,	from	the	vantage	point	afforded	by	the	
extended	interpretation	of	Bechtel’s	architecture,	we	ask	ourselves	the	question	‘Does	the	
presence	of	an	external	material	symbol	system	require,	or	at	least	strongly	indicate,	
cognitive	change,	in	the	sense	of	the	installation	of	a	revolutionary	package	of	more	
sophisticated	psychological	capacities?’,	then	our	answer	should	be	‘yes’.	This	is	because	the	
appearance	of	material	symbols	to	which	certain	internal	mechanisms	are	coupled	via	
embodied	sensorimotor	interactions	is	itself	(it	is	not	merely	evidence	of)	cognitive	change.	
It	is	the	emergence	of	new	and	more	sophisticated	cognitive	structures.	This	remains	true	
even	if	(and	we	cannot	be	sure	about	this)	the	inner	part	of	the	extended	ancient	mind	
instantiates	nothing	more	than	the	old	connectionist	currency	of	statistical	pattern	
completion	that	was	already	operative	in	the	pre-symbolic	context.	So,	for	fans	of	the	
extended	cognition	hypothesis,	if	the	small	geometric	clay	objects	at	Çatalhöyük	are	in	fact	
material	symbols,	then	the	Neolithic	mind	at	that	site	did	undergo	significant	cognitive	
change.			
	
It	might	seem	as	if	our	extended-mind-based	argument	for	the	conclusion	that	cognitive	
change	has	occurred	has	the	unhappy	effect	of	rendering	that	conclusion	empty	or	trivial.	
The	complaint	here	would	go	as	follows:	if	material	symbols	routinely	count	as	cognitive	
elements,	and	if	the	notion	of	the	‘symbolic’	applies	generally	to	many	elements	in	material	
culture,	then	a	very	large	number	of	the	changes	in	material	culture	will	count	
straightforwardly	as	cognitive	changes.	So	the	conclusion	that	cognitive	change	has	
occurred	says	nothing	–	or	at	least	nothing	interesting	or	illuminating.	Fortunately,	the	
specific	extended-mind-based	argument	outlined	earlier	does	not	fall	prey	to	this	particular	
objection,	because	that	argument	is	developed	in	the	context	of	(i)	material	elements	that	
are	symbolic	in	a	restricted	and	demanding	sense,	in	that	they	function	as	recombinable	
constituents	within	standardized	systems	of	representational	structures	and	relationships,	
and	(ii)	a	related,	and	equally	restricted	and	demanding,	account	of	‘cognition’,	according	to	
which	certain	outcomes	in	humans	performance	are	underpinned	by	atomic	symbols	that	
are	exploited	and	manipulated	according	to	the	principles	of	a	compositional	syntax	and	
semantics,	thus	enabling	the	systematicity	condition	for	thought	to	be	met	in	those	
domains.	As	Bennison-Chapman	nicely	shows	(see	above),	not	all	material-cultural	elements	
will	be	material	symbols	in	the	sense	of	(i).	Building	on	this,	we	can	now	add,	given	(ii),	that	
the	kinds	of	exploitation	and	manipulation	to	which	the	(by	our	current	criterion)	non-
symbolic	elements	will	be	subjected	will	be	of	the	wrong	kind	to	count	as	cognitive.	That	
should	be	enough	to	alleviate	the	trivialization	concern,	because	a	large	number	of	the	
changes	that	take	place	in	material	culture	will	not	count	as	cognitive	changes.	In	other	
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words,	if	one	concludes,	on	the	basis	of	the	extended-mind-based	argument	offered	earlier,	
that	cognitive	change	has	occurred,	one	is	saying	something	with	genuine	content.	
	
5.	Conclusions	
		
In	this	chapter,	I	have	used	the	example	of	the	alleged	emergence	of	higher	levels	of	
cognition	and	consciousness	in	the	Neolithic,	as	indicated	by	the	material-cultural	evidence	
at	Çatalhöyük,	to	explore	the	relationship	that	exists	between	the	archaeology	of	the	
ancient	mind	and	distributed	cognitive	science.	I	have	argued	that	the	conclusions	that	
should	be	drawn	regarding	the	occurrence	of	cognitive	change,	based	on	the	material-
cultural	evidence,	will	be	different	(indeed,	diametrically	opposed)	depending	on	which	
version	of	distributed	cognition	is	embraced.	Adopting	the	embedded	version,	one	cannot	
know	whether	there	has	been	cognitive	change	on	the	basis	of	the	appearance	of	material	
symbols	in	the	archeological	record,	since	such	change	may	not	be	required	to	explain	our	
successful	deployment	of	those	symbols.	Adopting	the	extended	version,	one	may	be	able	
to	conclude	that	cognitive	change	has	occurred,	since	the	material	symbols	themselves	may	
have	cognitive	status,	but	that	conclusion	would	still	leave	one	unsure	about	the	character	
of	the	inner	contribution	to	the	overall	cognitive	process.	So,	although	there	may	be	good	
reason	to	think	that	the	distributed	perspective	is	the	archaeologist’s	friend,	that	
enthusiasm	needs	to	be	matched	by	an	understanding	of	the	challenges,	as	well	as	the	
advantages,	of	such	an	alliance.		
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